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Emotions in the Theory of Cultural-Historical Subjectivity of González Rey

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Abstract

In the theoretical thinking of González Rey, the acknowledge of the generating character of emotions and their infinite unfolding associated with symbolic productions, which are not of the order of meaning, has represented an essential step for a theory of cultural-historical subjectivity capable of transcending the limitations associated with the treatment of this subject in the modern period. Emotions must be understood in their generating capacity, not as effects, but as processes that maintain a recursive relationship with other psychic processes, as opposed to understanding the psychic coming from other elements, which are at the base, until today, of all atomistic psychology of empirical orientation. In this work, we review different investigations carried out in the field of emotions by Fernando González-Rey, which will allow us to understand better the role of emotions in the production of subjective senses that always anticipate the actions of the subject, actions that can have very different forms of expression. Therefore, those subjective senses associated with the subject can be corroded, distorted, or even modified in the process of production of new subjective senses that is developing in the course of the subject's action.

Keywords Emotion · Subjectivity · Subjective senses · Subjective settings

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The Cuban psychologist Fernando González Rey worked for more than 20 years on the subject of cultural-historical subjectivity. The inseparability of the emotions of symbolic processes as purely human productions constitutes the strong hypothesis of that theory. We think that it is important to refer to the topic of emotions in a first work to understand the importance and the main role that this author gives them for developing a theory of subjectivity that, in recent years has been revitalized and reconceptualized within psychology, from being understood as a complex system that is constituted historically in the cultural life of men and that is simultaneously constituent and constituted of human culture.

The main importance of this work is the fact that even though emotions constitute strong points in González Rey's theory of subjectivity, he only dedicates them two investigations in the more than 100 articles he wrote throughout his life, which are *The Affectivity from a perspective of subjectivity*, published in 1999, and *The place of emotions in the social constitution of the psychic*, which was published in the year 2000. In his other investigations, the theme of emotions appears in a scattered way, same as Vygotsky's investigations. However, it was Vygotsky's works, mainly those between 1931 and 1934 (date on which he dies), that the main inspiration of González Rey gives a twist to his work on 1995, where the unit of emotions and symbolic processes became units of analysis to think of a different ontology of psychic processes.

The tendency of both emotions and affective processes, in general, has been studied from their physiology, their relational character, semiotic nature, etc., but their specificity as subjective processes has been little attended. In general, emotional processes have been presented as epiphenomena of other systems, and not in their essential condition as constituents of human subjectivity. In future works, we will deal with the theme of human symbolic productions, which are unique within each culture and even within communities of the countries themselves. These symbolic productions in close proximity with emotions become the constituents of cultural-historical subjectivity that puts us in a different perspective, representing a category in process, which accounts for certain processes to the same extent that others appear, challenging the continuity of theoretical elaboration. Subjectivity is producing knowledge in its procedurality and is not exhausted in any particular definition (González Rey 2011, p. 128).

In *The place of emotions in the social constitution of the psychic*, González Rey wrote:

After the experimental origin of psychology in Leipzig in 1879, and despite the fact that the great majority of relevant scholars of American psychology at the beginning of the century were trained in the Wundt laboratory (Titchener, Cattell, Stanley Hall and Mead himself), the development of American psychology in the early twentieth century took the path of an absolute identification with the natural sciences model, and that change was extraordinarily strong in the development of world psychology. (González Rey, 2000, p.1)

The understanding of the psyche was increasingly acquiring a naturalistic tone, which in one way or another was expressed in currents as different as psychoanalysis and behaviorism in regard to the theoretical construction of its object. Behaviorism emphasizes a common object in the study of man and animals: behavior, developing analogous laws for their study in the animal and human world, which was accompanied by laboratories full of pigeons in the psychology faculties of most of the world.

This biologizing vision at the beginning of the last century makes way to a social representation of the psychic, which is legitimated with great force with the emergence of Soviet psychology, strongly influenced by Marxism. The works of two of his pioneers, Vygotsky and Rubinstein, were very important at that time; however, Vygotsky's influence extended more strongly, becoming an important reference of different currents of thought in Western psychology, mainly to through the interest that American psychologists Cole and Wertsch, both pupils of Jerome Bruner, showed in Vygotsky's work. Vygotsky, in his work *Thought and Language*, whose chapters were written at different times, but which in general has been associated with the final moment of his work (Leontiev 2001), stated:

The first question that appears in this first chapter when we consider the relationship between thought and speech with other aspects of the life of consciousness is related to the connection between intellect and affection. Among the most basic defects of the traditional approaches in the study of psychology has been the separation of the intellect from the volitional affective aspects of consciousness. The inevitable consequence of the separation of these functions has been the transformation of thought into an autonomous flow. The thought itself became the thinker of thoughts. Thought was divorced from the complete vitality of life, from the motives, interests and inclinations of individual thinking. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 50)

The position expressed previously by Vygotsky even leads to a questioning of the traditional idea of cognitive processes so entrenched both in psychology and in pedagogy in Cuba, since cognition, as a process of human development, cannot be separated from the emotionality of the subject. In cognitive processes, the information about the world converges with the emotional state of the person who thinks, which is definitive of the sensitivity of the subject toward information, whose meaning integrates fantasy, imagination, and dominant emotional states of the thinking subject.

The recovery of the thinking subject would then imply, according to Vygotsky, the integration of emotions, fantasy, and imagination in intellectual development. There is no intellectual development separated from the person's development. In that first chapter of *Thought and Language*, as well as in the last chapter of *Thought and Word*, Vygotsky strongly returns to the theme of the integration of the cognitive and affective into new units of the psychic life that are inseparable from psychic processes. One of the categories that express that unit of different psychic processes in that book is meaning. However, as with all categories and ideas developed by Vygotsky, the idea of meaning and the idea thought as an expression of the person's vitality were not developed but were only presented as an omen of a new moment of that developing thought that never came to fruition, partly because of the enormous pressure that Stalinism exerted on him, but that allows new interpretations of his legacy to psychology.

It was precisely from the development of the ideas from the final moment of Vygotsky's work, associated with both the sense and the definition of thought, as well as his ideas associated with the role of emotion, fantasy, and imagination in *Art Psychology*, and in some of his first works on defectology, developed at the beginning of his career, that González Rey developed the categories of subjective sense and subjective configuration as a way to understand human psychic processes differently, that is, as a complex subjective production of the concrete subjects.

Subjective productions appear early in the life of a child, when it is differentiated by the configuration of its early affections, even in moments before the appearance of speech.

However, before the appearance of speech, the symbolic resources of children are much smaller than at later times in their development. The most complex psychic processes of human beings become subjective when their functioning is regulated by subjective configurations that express the history and current context of individuals, regulating the psychic process regardless of the immediate demands of a given reality; in human experience, imagination and fantasy are an expression of the emotional commitment of any psychological operation or function. Psychic operations, when expressed as moments of a subjective configuration, acquire a generating and transforming role, defined by their imaginary and fictional character, an aspect that essentially differentiates them from properly psychological operations.

From the Sense Category of Vygotsky to the Subjective Sense of González Rey

From the second half of the 1990s until his death in March 2019, González Rey oriented his work to the development of the theme of subjectivity from a cultural-historical position (González Rey 1999). In the beginning, that effort was largely, as stated before, inspired by the definition of “meaning” given by Vygotsky in his work “Thought and Language” (1987), who assumes this concept from the work of the French psychologist, French Paulhan, whose main interest was the study of the relationship between the meaning and sense of words in the use of language. From Vygotsky’s perspective, “the meaning is the set of all the psychological factors that appear in the conscience as a result of the word” (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 188). In that work, Vygotsky expresses:

Paulhan says that the meaning of the word is complex, fluid and constantly changing. In some ways he is unique to each conscience and to an individual conscience in different circumstances. In that aspect, the meaning of the word is inexhaustible. The word acquires meaning in a sentence. The phrase itself makes sense, however, in the context of the paragraph, the paragraph in the context of the book, and the book in the context of the author’s chosen works. Finally, the meaning of the word is determined by everything that in the consciousness is related to what is expressed in the word. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 276)

Something that Vygotsky highlights in that work, especially in his first and last chapters, is the significance of the procedural aspects of the relationship between thought, word, and language, as well as the relationship of those functions with the consciousness as a system. In the 1990s of the last century, the concept of sense was highlighted in its relevance to discuss a new moment of Vygotsky’s thinking by Leontiev (1992) and by González Rey (1995). However, both the concept of sense and that of “perezhivanie” were ignored by Vygotsky’s followers until very recent times, which partly explains the fact that these concepts were not compatible with the dominant theoretical representations in their main interpreters, both in Soviet psychology and in Western psychology (González Rey, 2002, 2009; Fakhrutdinova, 2010; Yanitsky, 2012).

Sense, from Vygotsky’s perspective, is the most unstable and dynamic part of meaning. Vygotsky proposes that meaning is only a stone in the building of sense (Vygotsky 1987, p. 244), alluding to an emotional-intellectual integration in the understanding of human

experience. Meaning is the element of consciousness due to the historical relationship with the word, while the sense is a holistic and total, cognitive-affective experience. Sense is closer to the emotional motivations of consciousness than meaning. The relevance of these concepts for the development of the theme of subjectivity on new bases (González Rey, 2002, 2009, 2011) is given by the new representation of consciousness that both imply. On the basis of these concepts, consciousness can be understood more as a generating system than as a mere reflection of external activities. This position, in turn, can lead to overcome the explanation of the genesis of consciousness as a result of internalization.

When Vygotsky argues that: “the meaning of the word is the aggregate of all psychological functions that appear in our consciousness as a result of the word” (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 276), at the same time, he emphasizes that the meaning is only one of those areas of the meaning that the word acquires with the context of speech. For González Rey (2011), such statement allows us to advance in the definition of consciousness about new ontological premises; consciousness is formed by processes essentially different from those that characterize external activity with objects. Sense opens the possibility of a definition of consciousness organized simultaneously in human action and as a psychic organization.

Unlike the sense, as that concept had been coined by Vygotsky, the subjective senses proposed by González Rey (1999) are defined by the symbolic-emotional nature of the human experience. Subjectivity emerges from this perspective as a new theoretical paradigm rather than the emergence of a new concept; subjectivity implies the access to the study of psychological experience, whether individually or socially. If the psyche is developed throughout the evolution of living creatures as the progressive ability to respond to signals from the natural world, subjectivity, then, represents the human capacity to produce differentiated subjective senses, which represent the symbolic-emotional form of all experience in the context of culture.

Subjective senses never appear explicitly in behavior, so for example, sadness is not a subjective sense; the subjective sense would be the momentary symbolic-emotional expression that can be seen on the fluid course of the person's expression, and that by their relationship with other elements that are made intelligible by the interpretation, can be identified as a subjective sense of the complex constellation of subjective senses in which the subjective configuration of sadness is expressed.

The subjective senses proposed by González Rey are not associated to words; they represent the union of the symbolic and the emotional, not being an aggregate of elements. Subjective senses indicate the subjective character of any human action or expression; subjectivity is defined by the nature of a particular type of phenomenon that is general to all human productions, whether they are social or individual.

The concept of subjective sense allows to understand the subjective production in the action of the person. The subjective senses are not identical contents, feasible to be repeated in different actions of the person; they are unique, and they represent an emotional symbolic unit that emerges in context and that always results from the confluence of several subjective configurations of the personality at a specific moment of the person, which is inseparable from the subjective configuration that is organized in the course of a lived experience.

The historical and the social appear in the subjective configurations of the person, a psychological unit more stable than the subjective senses, but inseparable from it. The social is also expressed in events that appear in the course of the lived experience and they are responsible for new positions of the person in that process, positions that they can also be associated to the genesis of new subjective senses. The subjective impact of all social

experience is inseparable from the positions and decisions of the person and from their subjective configurations, a permanent source of the production of subjective senses in the present moment. In the words of González Rey:

The subjective senses that accompany the reaction of a student or teacher to a situation in the classroom: they are never only an expression of the lived event, but rather of what the child feels and symbolically creates, when he is jealous of another child in the classroom itself, when he feels that his parents prefer his brother to him, when the teacher's expression made him feel humiliated in a way that he had felt before by his father's behavior towards him, etc. Subjective senses are the expression of a lived world, of a world lived in the current unity of experience. (González Rey, 201, p. 312)

The subjective senses express an infinite mobility in the course of the person's action; however, that mobility has its limits, which are given by the actualization of moments of a lived history, which appear as subjective senses in the present configuration of the vivid. These limits and moments of that history respond to the most stable subjective configurations of personality, upon which the subjective configurations that emerge in a concrete experience are organized. Subjectivity is defined, then, as the symbolic-emotional production that emerges from a lived experience, which integrates the historical and contextual into the process of its configuration. The basic unit of subjectivity is the subjective senses.

The operative, sensory, or information processing processes, outside their relationship with the subjective system of the person, may appear on a formal-operational plane, but not as a generator of emotion. These processes are psychic processes, but we do not consider them as subjective. The definition of subjectivity presented in this article is inseparable from a notion of person. The person in this perspective is not an epiphenomenon of any social structure or practice; he has a subjective generating capacity compared to what has been lived, which allows him multiple options, decisions, and actions loaded with subjective senses in the experience process.

The Influence of Neuropsychology on the Theory of Emotions

Most of the theories of emotions are related to their physiology; in our opinion this is because in the course of the development of American psychology and Russian psychology (later Soviet psychology) in the early twentieth century, they took the path of absolute identification with the natural science model, and that change was extraordinarily strong in the development of world psychology. Naturalistic psychology was unable to develop a different vision of emotion, specific to the cultural condition of man, hence the substantialization of the sources of emotions in universal tendencies such as drive or the development of rigid and invariable taxonomies of needs that acted as the spaces in which different types of emotions could be located.

However, in this part of the work, we consider necessary to present some of the ideas that different authors have contributed to theories of emotions and that generated deep debates during the exchanges between González Rey and Madrigal Pérez in the last 3 years following that meeting between both that took place during the 5th Congress of the International Society for Historical-Cultural Activity Research (ISCAR) in 2017, held in Quebec City, Canada.

The case of Phineas Gage described by Harlow (1868) was undoubtedly one of the most commented and discussed between the two researchers following an interview granted by Daniel Goleman to Eduard Punset, in a part of the interview Goleman says:

Now we are discovering that teaching emotional and social skills to five-year-olds up until university, makes them much more civic, makes them better students. It is a mistake to think that cognition and emotions are totally separated, on the contrary, they occupy the same brain area, so helping children manage their emotions means they can learn better. (Goleman, 2013)

The debates generated between González Rey and the authors of this article are due to an accident of a railroad worker, where Harlow (1868) describes that the worker suffered severe damage to the brain, specifically in part of the frontal lobe. Gage underwent noticeable changes in his personality and temperament, which was considered as evidence that the frontal lobes were responsible for processes related to emotional behavior, personality, and executive functions in general. This unfortunate fact, by the way, has also allowed us to make a profound modification in the understanding of psychic functions as isolated and elementary functions.

Charles Darwin, for his part, in his book *The Expression of Emotions in Men and Animals* (1872), assumed that human facial responses evidenced identical emotional states in all human beings. He related the expression of emotion with other behaviors and stated that all were result of evolution. From there, he tried to compare them in various species. His main ideas were that expressions of emotion evolve from behaviors, that if such behaviors are beneficial, they will increase and decrease if they are not, and that opposite messages are often indicated by opposite movements and postures (principle of antithesis). The theories that had as a base the James-Lange Theory, simultaneously proposed in 1884, but independently, a physiological theory of emotion. The theory of the right hemisphere hypothesis was proposed in the early twentieth century by Mills (1912), who claimed that both emotion and emotional expression are more represented in the right hemisphere. For Mills (1912), both emotion and emotional expression were represented in the cerebral cortex: on one hand, emotion was represented in the prefrontal region, while emotional expression was represented in the medial frontal region. This point of view, in which the right hemisphere is involved in all processes of emotion, was subsequently retaken by Sackeim and Gur (1978) and authors. It is currently believed that the specialization of the right hemisphere is limited to its expression and perception (Adolphs et al. 1994).

In 1980, Zajonc proposed that affective and cognitive systems are largely independent (i.e., emotion is presented without cognition) and that affect is more potent and occurs first. Zajonc (1980), in this regard, stated: "It is concluded that affection and cognition are under the control of separated and partially independent systems and each can be influenced in a variety of ways, and both constitute resources of effects in processing information" (Zajonc 1980, p. 151). Instead, Lazarus (1982) argues that thought is a necessary condition of emotion. He opposes, therefore, the position adopted by Zajonc, considering that his work reflects two generalized misunderstandings about what is understood by cognitive processes in emotion.

As stated above, these authors place more emphasis on the physiological aspect of emotions than on their specific condition of the cultural condition of men. However, it seemed very important for Madrigal Pérez and González Rey to discuss these issues because although the man has a cultural-historical origin.

Emotions as an Expression of the Level of Commitment of the Specific Needs of the Cultural Condition of Men

Emotions are dynamic states that simultaneously compromise the physiology, the subjective experiences, and the behaviors of the subject. Emotions appear as an expression of the level of commitment of the subject's needs with the different activities and forms of relationship in which he expresses his daily life. The needs are the emotional states that accompany and/or develop in the different spaces of activity and relationship of the subject. The subject can reach any of the social spaces in which he acts with defined needs, which will not prevent the transformation of these needs in the course of his action, nor the appearance of new ones. Originally, in the earliest periods of ontogenesis, emotions responded essentially to biological needs, but quickly, with the emergence of meaningful processes committed to the child's socialization, emotions began to express themselves in relation to the needs constituted in a child's social life, which are specifically human needs.

The need for communication appears very early in the child's life, and it is already associated with the production of a new type of emotions, which are not directly dependent on the gratification of biological needs. The different processes involved in early communication between the child and adults are a source of emotions that, in their interrelations, define new dynamic states that qualify the child's relationships with those around him. These new types of needs do not respond to a homeostatic mechanism of tension reduction, nor are they oriented by an act of satisfaction: they have a procedural nature committed to the permanent production of new emotions, thanks to which the emotional tension necessary to ensure the performance of the most complex forms of human activity is granted. The durability of men emotional states is one of the essential elements in the development of the complex capacities associated with human creation, which presuppose concentration and creation for long periods of time. Men is permanently producing emotions associated with the needs that characterize his involvement in the different forms of activity and, at the same time, that stable presence of diverse emotions is constituent of new needs that appear. We find interesting what González Rey proposes when he says:

Human emotions are often confused with experiences, which makes them be defined in terms of positive and negative, however, far from what has been frequently expressed in literature (Leontiev 2001; Murray 1964/1967) there is a infinite number of emotions that characterize human activity differently, many of which do not have a conscious significance for the subject that produces them, nor have they found a conceptualization in psychological theory, or in systems of social representations. (González Rey, 1999, p. 129)

Experiences are emotions consciously signified and recognized by the subject (González Rey 1999). The confusion between emotion and experience has led to an erroneous and rationalist understanding of the categories used to account for the place of emotion in health and disease processes, such as the stress category. Sometimes an identity appears between stress and negative emotions; however, the type of emotions that generate the states of the organism associated with the increase in their sensitivity to somatic diseases is, in our opinion, one of the most complex problems health sciences have in the future. For González Rey (1999), there are different emotions and emotional states that affect the somatic functioning of men and that are not consciously identified by the subject.

The fact that emotions can have a semiotic function does not mean that they appear through the meanings that precede them, that is, it does not mean that their origin is semiotic, since the states of necessity are extremely complex processes, which respond to the particular organization of multiple emotional processes associated with the relationship between the needs of the subject and the way in which it is expressed in its different activities and relationships. The configuration of a need is committed with multiple elements of different nature that converge in the development of any subject activity.

In the interest of getting a deeper understanding of emotions in their distinctive peculiarity, it must be transcended beyond the mere relationship that their peculiarity establishes with the category of necessity, because it transcends it by far.

To determine the character and function of emotions, we must first start from the fact that in the emotional processes, there is a reciprocal action between the development of events that occur according to the deepest motivations of human being, or that occur against them, and the development of their activity, which is oriented toward the satisfaction of these needs and motivations or, on the other hand, between the development of internal organic processes, which cover the vital functions of which depends the life of the organism in total. The result of this correlation is that the individual prepares for the respective act of contraction. Psychic processes mediate the relationship between these two series of phenomena, and these psychic processes are mediated by simple receptions, perceptions, and the capture of meaning and the conscious anticipation of the results or acts.

The emotional processes obtain a positive or negative character, depending on whether the act that the individual executes and the effect to which he is subjected are in a positive or negative relationship with his needs, interests, and postures. The relationship of the individual with respect to the latter and with the development of the activity, which due to a whole complex of objective circumstances may run according to them or opposing them, determines the destination of their emotions.

The correlation between emotions and needs can be carried out in several ways, namely, according to the nature of the need, which the individual experiences as his need for something or someone which opposes toward him, and which at the same time characterizes his dependence of something or someone and also their aspiration for that something or that someone. The satisfaction or non-satisfaction of a need, which does not manifest itself in the form of a feeling, but, for example, is experienced in the elementary form of organic sensations, can produce the emotional state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, of joy or sadness, pain and similar states. However, the need as an active tendency can be felt through a feeling so that it can appear or manifest itself as a need. Our respective feeling, constituted by a set of emotions that are constantly being unfold by a certain object or by a certain person, whether it's love or hate, etc., is formed by the need, and as we become aware of the dependence of the satisfaction on this object or person and we feel the emotional states of pleasure or displeasure granted to us, the emotion, which manifests itself as a necessity, as the concrete psychic form of its existence, expresses the active aspect of the need. Therefore, ambition and the impulse toward what is attractive to the feeling are necessarily also involved in the emotion, just as the emotional tint that impulse and desire always have. The common causes of will and emotion (affection, passion) are found in the needs: if we become aware of an object, on which the satisfaction of our needs depends, a desire oriented toward it is awakened in us. Since we experience this dependence as pleasure or dislike from the object, a certain form of it is created in us. Obviously, one is inseparable from the other. The

existence of independent functions or aptitudes completely leads them to these two forms of manifestation as a unitary unit, perhaps seen only in some textbooks of psychology and nowhere else.

According to this dynamic character of emotions, which reflects the double active-passive relationship of the human being with respect to the world, and which is contained in the need, the function of emotions is also manifested in the activity of men, according to what we have seen, as bilateral: emotions are formed in the course of human activity, which is oriented to the satisfaction of their own needs. When they form, then, in the activity of the individual, the needs experienced in forms of emotions are at the same time a stimulus to the activity.

The relationship between emotions and needs is not, however, absolute, as we can see in animals that act according their organic needs; the same appearance can have a different and often contradictory meaning for the variety of organic needs, when an animal satisfies a need, another one may suffer damage. Therefore, if the same development of vital activity can cause such different emotional reactions, both negative and positive, even less absolute is this relationship between men. The needs of human beings are not reduced to some simple organic needs but rather a whole hierarchy of needs, interests, and positions arises, which may be the equivalent of Nietzsche's power of will (Nietzsche 1888 en Vattimo 2000).

Due to its variety, the same act or appearance can reach a different meaning in its relationship with respect to different needs. Oneself and the same event may be provided with contradictory emotional signs, thus according to Rubistein (1968) producing a split of human feelings, named ambivalence. This can often explain the transformation of the emotional sphere, due to an alteration in the orientation of the personality, where a feeling produced by a certain appearance suddenly breaks into the contradictory.

For this reason, the feelings of the human being cannot be determined in isolation by their orientation toward the needs taken in isolation, but rather they are conditioned altogether by the relationship toward the personality. The feelings of human beings depend on the relationships that exist between the acts to which the individual is driven by and also by his needs; these reflect the structure of his personality and discover his orientation and his postures. What leaves man indifferent and what affects his feelings, what pleases him and what grieves him, it is illustrated and sometimes discovered more precisely than everything else in his nature or character.

In the field of historical forms of existence, in men, and when the individual already appears as a person and not only as an organism, emotional processes are no longer conditioned only by organic needs but by spiritual ones, by tendencies, motivations, and the personality positions and the multiple forms of the activity, which are formed by the historical-social evolution of human being.

The objective relationships, in which the human being enters with the satisfaction of his needs, are the source from where his feelings emerge and subsequently become complex, the forms of collaboration that develop in the course of life, but it is fundamentally at work where various social feelings are created. Even with regard to family feelings, despite the organic basis of sexual feeling, it is not the feelings given a unique time that create the various forms of family life but rather the various forms of the family, which are developed alternately in the historical-social evolution that produce and develop the feelings of the family. Human feelings express the reality of the reciprocal relationships of man, as a psychological, biological, and social being, with the world, and especially with other beings.

In these historical forms of the social existence of man, the material bases of human feelings and emotions must be sought above all, just as the material bases of emotions must be seen in

animals in the basic or fundamental forms of their biological existence, and not only in individual physiological mechanisms (Rubistein, 1968, p. 511).

Since emotions are based on vital reciprocal relationships that transcend the individual's consciousness with the environment, the theory and classification of emotions should not start from the subtlety of the phenomenological analysis of emotional experience or the physiological study of the mechanisms of the emotional process. Rather, they must begin with the reality of reciprocal relationships, on which emotions are based. However, in animals, emotional reactions are linked to the manifestations of their vital activity, with the most important biological acts being searching for food, procreation, and with the struggle for existence. We think that the biological theory of emotions is the right background for our theory; it was established by Darwin (1872) and attributes these emotions to the organic stimulus of instincts, regarding animals. The biological theory of emotions is incorrect if it passes from animals to humans. Due to the different forms of existence of the human being, the fundamentals of their emotions also vary. But the biologizing theory relates to human emotions as being very intimately close with instincts.

Essentially, James, quoted by Rubistein (1968, p. 511), started from this point of view:

The object of anger, love and fear, not only encourages action, but also produces changes in posture and in the person himself; it manifests itself differently in respiration, blood circulation and organic functions. If the actions are inhibited, the emotional manifestations still persist, and in the traits of the person we can still read anger when the punch he was trying could not be performed. Instinctive reactions and emotional manifestations imperceptibly turn into each other. (James, 1909, p. 374)

For Rubistein (1968), James considered difficult to draw the boundary between emotional processes and instinctive reactions.

Every object that excites an instinct produces emotion. The only difference there is or that could be noted is that the reaction that is designated as emotional ends in the subject's own body, while the so-called instinctive reaction tends to continue and enter into a practical relationship with the object that has excited it. (James, 1909, p. 374)

This formulation was adopted in its entirety by behaviorism. In instinct, according to Watson, it represents an outward-oriented act; emotion is a reaction that is linked to the organism. But between emotion and instinct, there is no clear limit. Both instinct and emotion are stereotyped, inherited reactions. This theory of inseparable bonding, almost undifferentiated from instinct and emotion, was then concretized in two variants (Rubistein, 1968). Emotions are well regarded as the subjective aspect of instincts, that is, as specific experiences linked to instinctive action, or as remains of the instincts, as indications in the human psyche as they expire. McDougall, assuming that Darwin's idea was brought to a good end, developed a theory of emotions based on the assumption that all types of emotions were the affective aspect of an instinctive process.

This link between emotion and instinct, which McDougall tried to establish, was opposed by other researchers such as Larguier des Bancelles, proposing another theory and interpreting Darwin's theory in his own way. This theory states that: "Emotion is not an opposite aspect of instinct, it is a rudiment or a flawed instinct" (Darwin 1872, p. 67).

These theories place human emotions in an inseparable correlation with primitive instincts, giving them the seal of exclusively biological forms and taking away any development perspective. According to them, emotions are simply vestiges of something that happened in the past. They are either the product of the dissolution of the instincts, which disorganize all human activity, or inevitable concomitant phenomena of the instincts.

However, the exclusive link between emotions and instincts does not coincide with physiological data, which indicates that emotions are conditioned by the cerebral cortex, while instincts are located in the subcortical. Nor does it respond to psychological facts.

From the historical evolutionary point of view, it is clear that emotions were primitively linked to instincts and impulses. This link still exists, but it is wrong to relate the feelings of the human being exclusively to instinctive reactions and primitive impulses. The emotional sphere has a long evolutionary trajectory, from the primitive, sensitive, and affective reactions in animals to the evolved feelings of men.

The feelings of men are the feelings of the historical men (Rubinstein 1968, p. 512). In men, emotions are linked with the basic forms of historical-social existence, that is, with their way of life, and with the fundamental orientations of their activity.

The emergence of the social forms of collaboration and of man-to-man relationships creates a whole new world of specific human feelings toward the individual and toward men in general, whose real base consists in collaboration and common interests that derive from it. In this way, humanitarian feelings, feelings of solidarity, sympathy, jealousy, and even feelings of hatred and repudiation arise. These last two feelings, to which many others can be added, arise with the emergence of social contrasts as real material factors, as indignation, revolt, and enmity.

Only on real relationships, in which a man find himself, that determine his feelings, which are formed by a set of emotions, many of them experienced in a nonconscious way that may happen at any point in life and in any context. We do not have a conscious control over all the emotions that we generate throughout or lives, but we can feel the progressive change in our mood. For example, if we begin to experience certain emotions with our partner on a daily basis, in a repetitive and constant manner, such as sadness, anger, or disgusts, it may be that we have started to direct toward them some feelings related to fears that are often unfounded, such as an eminent loss of our partner for treason with another person.

Therefore, just as the purely natural primitive relationships of individuals of different sex have been transformed on a social basis, adopting the character of family relationships, like a mother with her child, specific human feelings develop in human beings of the different family members. The sexual instinct becomes the human feeling of love, which is complicated based on the character of the family and the social pressures that are exerted on individuals, where sometimes they can cost a person's life in countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, where people decide to express their sexual orientation, even though they go against certain religious preconceptions.

No philosophical, political, or religious system can conveniently reduce or redirect an emotion to an isolated or "pure" emotionality or affectivity, that is, in an abstract way. All true emotions imply the affective and the intellectual, the experience, and the knowledge, as well as the volitional aspects of instinct and ambition, as it manifests in it the whole human being up to a certain way. In this concrete unity, emotions serve as impulse and motives of the activity, conditioning the development of the activity of the individual, and they are also conditioned, in turn, by him. According to Rubinstein, "in psychology, one often speaks of the unity between emotions, affection and intellect,

believing that in this way we will overcome the own abstract point of view to see the psyche in isolated elements or functions” (Rubinstein, 1968, p. 519).

In fact, we consider that one should not simply speak of the unity of the affective and the intellectual within the emotions themselves, as well as within the intellect; however, if within the emotions we highlight the emotionality or affectivity as such, then it can be said that it does not determine the activity of the subject but regulates it, as it is already determined by other factors. Emotionality makes the individual to be affected by different impulses and thus creates a system of compounds that adjust the emotional states to the corresponding level and adapt the receptive and cognitive functions, as well as the motor. In short, all active and volitional functions between each other create this system, thus conditioning the tone and rhythm of the activity, its affinity for one or another plane. In other words, emotionality, that is, the factor of emotions, predominantly determines the dynamic aspect of the activity.

For Rubinstein (1945, 1968), it would be wrong to apply this principle to emotions and feelings as a whole as Lewin does. The significance of feelings and emotions cannot be reduced to this dynamic, because they are not limited to the emotional aspect taken in isolation. The increase in sensitivity and intensity in a performance has, as a rule, a selective character, in a certain emotional state, dominated by a certain feeling, making the individual more sensitive to a certain type of stimuli and less to another type. Hence, dynamic changes in emotional processes have, as a rule, an oriented character. Finally, it also designates and determines the emotional process of the emotion, which has a dynamic character and cannot be separated from its content nor the object where the activity is oriented.

Only if a strong emotional excitement inhibits the conscious intellectual activity, they can begin to dominate the dynamic aspects in the sense and to select the direction of the action; strong emotional excitement creates a tension, in which any cause can cause a discharge. Such discharge can also be an impulsive action. This action is predominantly conditioned by dynamic relationships, which have been formed by tension in the subject; however, the relaxing action is not oriented toward the object or the subject that has produced this tension. That is why this action is not very motivated; the reaction is not adequate to the stimuli. An insignificant motive can cause, in such cases, a disproportionate emotional outburst, where many people succumb differently depending on the particularities of their temperament. Affective outbursts are produced, almost always, by conflicting situations, in which the individual gives in to strong impulses that are oriented in opposite directions, that is, they are not reconcilable.

A series of strong emotional reactions can disorganize the activity of a man by shock, placing him in a state of helplessness and depression where he can no longer do anything that requires special tension and concentration. Also, sometimes, a strong feeling may take control of the individual, mobilizing his own strengths to perform at a level that could have not been able to reach without this feeling.

The joy that is produced by a meaningful experience can cause such a flow of energy that nothing seems impossible to achieve for the individual. The contrast of the dynamic effect of emotions that appears almost always, whether positive, adaptive and stimulating, already negative, or disorganizing, depends especially on the multiformity of emotions and the stereotyped character of the peripheral physiological mechanisms of emotionality.

Spinoza (1667) had already correctly designated emotions as states by which “the efficiency of the body is increased or reduced, encouraged or inhibited” (Spinoza 1667 en Malinowski-Charles 2009, p. 376). The satisfaction that is caused by a success, as a rule, increases the energy to undertake other and even more complex activities, while grief and

discouragement, which arise in a job that has not developed well, reduce energy for further activities.

The state of an individual that finds an emotional expression is always conditioned by its correlation with the environment. In these reciprocal relationships, the individual is, in a way, both passive and active; sometimes it is more passive, sometimes more active. If the individual performs a preponderantly passive and hurtful function, his emotions express a determined state. They show the relationship of a subject with respect to the environment in a specific way.

Not all relationships with respect to the environment are expressed in the form of an emotion (Rubistein, 1968, p. 538). A certain relationship with respect to the environment can also be manifested in philosophy, in an ideology, in principles, and in rules of conduct, which an individual adopts theoretically and then continues them in practice, without experiencing them emotionally, at least at a conscious level. However, we disagree with Rubistein in this regard, as we believe that it is always an absolute expression of the emotion, because even when a certain relationship with the environment can be manifested in, in philosophy, an ideology, etc., in the very act of that manifestation, a man does not escape the emotional reactions that arise in the act, which are caused by the thoughts and memories associated with those relationships. In emotions, the relationship with respect to the environment, as well as the expression of a state, is shown in the exact way in which the experience has occurred (Fossa et al. 2019).

The influence of emotions on the development of ideas is almost always so clear that, together with the different physiological indicators, it can be considered as a diagnostic symptom of the emotional state. To this end, the experiment of the association of Jung was used in 1906, which in general terms consisted in offering the person a stimulating word, telling him to respond to it with the first word that comes to their mind under the effect of that same suggestive word. Research has shown that emotional experiences influence the type of associations in a certain way. If the initial representation does not affect the emotional experiences of the person with whom it is experienced, he starts associating ideas of objects that, thanks to their objective belonging to certain typical situations, appear almost simultaneously in everyday life, like a table-chair, pencil-sheet etc.; according to Jung, these are objective associations. If the person with whom one experiences starts having affective-emotional experiences, the association deviates from this normal route, following another unusual path.

Final Comments

We agree with González Rey on the fact that one of the reasons why the study of emotions has not had a sensible progress within psychology is precisely due to the absence of a theoretical framework that allows to integrate them organically into the process of psychological knowledge production, which is one of the objectives that accompany the development of the theme of subjectivity in our current works.

For us, emotion ceases to be a substantial micro-concept in isolated and static definitions, focused on concrete types of emotion, impulses, needs, or other concrete ways to conceptualize systems of emotions considered universal in the subject. Like Vygotsky and González Rey, we see the emotion committed to the changing process of needs that accompanies the psychic development, an elaboration of great complexity, which would have to be retaken and developed based on his work.

The emergence of new psychological needs is a source of qualitatively different emotions, which, in their new ways of integration with other emotions at specific moments of the activity, and of the general state of the subject, will lead to the emergence of new needs. The process of appearance of new needs and emotions is inseparable from the behavior of the organism as a system, which in the case of human beings is a system complexed by its subjective condition, which includes its capacity for differentiated action as the subject of his own activities.

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